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Restrictions on carrying concealed weapons are among the most
common gun control policies.' These statutes limit who may have a
deadly weapon-usually a handgun-hidden on their person when
outside the home. By reducing access to guns in public, concealed
weapons laws seek to make firearms less available for violence.
2
Details of concealed weapons laws vary greatly among localities,
but most approaches fall into two categories. One of these is a discre-
tionary system, sometimes called "may issue" licensing.3 Under this
policy, legal authorities grant licenses only to those citizens who can
establish a compelling need for carrying a gun.
The other approach is a non-discretionary, or "shall issue," sys-
tem.4 Here the authorities must provide a license to any applicant
who meets specified criteria. Because legal officials are often unwill-
ing to allow concealed weapons, adopting a shall issue policy usually
increases the number of persons with permits to carry guns.5
In 1985, the National Rifle Association announced that it would
* This research was supported by grant R49-CCR-306268 from the U.S. Public Health
Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
** Members of the Violence Research Group and Department of Criminology and
Criminal Justice, University of Maryland at College Park.
I SeeJAMEs D. WRIGHT ET. At-, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 243-72 (1983); Gary Kleck & E. Britt Patterson, The Impact of Gun Control and Gun
Ownership Levels on Violence Rates, 9J. QUANTrTATVE CRIMINOLOGY 249 (1993).
2 See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms, Violence, and Public Policy, 265 Scr. AM. 48
(1991).
3 GARY KLECK, POINT BIANKI GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 411-14 (1991).
4 Id.
5 Paul H. Blackman, Carrying Handguns for Personal Protection: Issues of Research
and and Public Policy (presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Crimi-
nology (Nov. 1985)).
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lobby for shall issue laws. 6 Several states, including Florida, Missis-
sippi, and Oregon, have since changed from may issue to shall issue
systems. Advocates of shall issue laws argue that such laws will both
prevent crime and reduce homicides.
7
This Article examines the frequency of homicides in the large
urban areas of Florida, Mississippi, and Oregon, before and after their
shall issue laws began. The analysis provides no support for the idea
that the laws reduced homicides; instead, it finds evidence of an in-
crease in firearm murders.
II. THE LAWS
On October 1, 1987, Florida adopted a shall issue law that greatly
expanded eligibility to carry a concealed weapon.8 The new statute
required the state to grant a concealed weapon license to any quali-
fied adult who had taken a firearms safety course. Those persons with
a history of drug or alcohol abuse, a felony conviction, mental illness,
physical inability, or who were not Florida residents were disqualified
from obtaining a license.
Prior to the passage of the Florida shall issue law, county officials
set their own standards for concealed carrying. Throughout the state,
about 17,000 persons held permits, including 1,300 in Dade county
(Miami) and 25 in Hillsborough county (Tampa).9 The number of
licenses rose steadily after the passage of the new law, reaching
141,000 in September 1994.10
Mississippi adopted a shall issue law onJuly 1, 1990.11 The Missis-
sippi law was similar to the Florida law, except that it did not require
firearms safety training. Mississippi's earlier law was highly restrictive,
generally allowing only security guards to have concealed weapons.
12
In contrast, the new law is more lenient; by November 1992, the state
had issued 5,136 new licenses.' 3
6 Id.; see also G. Ray Arnett, Sincerely, GRA, 133 AM. RIFLEMAN 7 (1985).
7 See, e.g., WAYNE LAPIERRE, GuNs, CRIME, AND FREEDOM 29-39 (1994); David B. Kopel,
Hold Your Fire: Gun Control Won't Stop Rising V'wlence, 63 POL'Y Rpv. 58 (1993).
8 FLA. STAT. ch. 790.06 (1992). See Richard Getchell, Carrying Concealed Weapons in Self-
Defenses: Florida Adopts Uniforn Regulations for the Issuance of Concealed Weapon Permits, 15 FLA.
ST. U.L. Rrv. 751 (1987).
9 See Lisa Getter, Accused Criminals Get Gun Permits, MIAMI HERALD, May 15, 1988, at 1A;
Stephen Koff& Bob Port, Gun Permits Soar Through Loopholes, ST. PETERSBURG TIME,Jan. 7,
1988, at Al.
10 FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, CONCEALED WEAPONS/FRE-
ARM LICENSE STATisTIcAL REPORT FOR PERIOD 10/01/87 TO 09/30/94 (1994).
11 MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101 (1991).
12 David Snyder, New Miss. Gun-Permit Law Raises Visions of Old West, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Aug. 13, 1990, at Al.
13 Grace Simmons, Police Want Concealed Guns Banned From Cars, CLARION-LEDGER (Jack-
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Oregon adopted a shall issue law on January 1, 1990, in a com-
promise between supporters and opponents of stricter gun control
measures. 14 Oregon's new law required county sheriffs to provide a
concealed handgun license to any qualified adult who had taken a
firearms safety course. People who could not obtain a license in-
cluded: those with outstanding arrest warrants, those on pretrial re-
lease, those with a history of mental illness, or those with a felony or
recent misdemeanor conviction.
In addition to easing laws on concealed carrying, Oregon's new
law also tightened standards for buying a gun. While the old law
barred convicted felons from owning handguns, the new law prohib-
ited convicted felons from owning any type of firearm. Oregon's new
law also lengthened the waiting period for handgun purchases and
required more detailed background checks. It further prohibited
most persons ineligible for a concealed handgun license from ob-
taining any firearm.
Before the passage of the new law in' 1991, Oregon's sheriffs is-
sued concealed handgun licenses at their discretion. In 1989, there
were fewer than 500 licensed carriers in Clackamas, Multnomah, and
Washington counties, the core of the Portland metropolitan area.'5
By October 1993, the number of licenses in these counties grew to
16,000.16
III. POSSIBLE EFFECTs OF SHALL ISSUE LICENSING ON CRIME
While the shall issue policies dearly increased the number of per-
sons licensed to carry concealed weapons in Florida, Mississippi, and
Oregon, their effects on crime are less obvious. There are grounds to
believe that crime might increase, decrease, or remain the same after
a shall issue law is passed.
Shall issue licensing might reduce crime by deterring criminal of-
fenders. Criminals generally wish to avoid victims who may be carry-
ing guns.17 Knowledge that many citizens have concealed weapons
could discourage attempts at crime, especially crimes against strangers
and crimes in public areas.
On the other hand, shall issue licensing also might raise levels of
criminal violence. This is so because shall issue laws increase the
son), Nov. 11, 1992, at Al.
14 OR. REV. STAT. § 166.291-§166.295 (1991). See also, Rhonda Canby, 1989 Oregon Gun
Control Legislation, 26 Wui.mEr t. REV. 565 (1990).
15 Bill MacKenzie, Packin' the Heat, OREGONIAN (Portland), Nov. 4, 1993, at Al.
16 Id.
17 See, e.g., JAMsS D. WRimHT & PETER H. Rossi, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A
SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FiEARMS 141-59 (1986).
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number of persons with easy access to guns. Zimring and Cook argue
that assaults are often impulsive acts involving the most readily avail-
able weapons.18 As guns are especially deadly weapons, more firearm
carriers might result in more homicides.
Advocates of shall issue licensing cite figures showing that few
legal carriers misuse their guns.' 9 Yet greater tolerance for legal carry-
ing may increase levels of illegal carrying as well. For example,
criminals have more reason to carry firearms-and to use them-
when their victims might be armed.20 Further, if permission to carry a
concealed weapon is easy to obtain, citizens and law enforcement offi-
cials may be less apt to view illegal carrying as a serious offense.
Still, shall issue licensing may be irrelevant to crime. Even in ar-
eas with shall issue policies, only a small fraction of adults have
licenses to carry guns. Many citizens keep guns in their homes, and
police officers often carry guns when off-duty and in plain clothes.
The increase in available firearms due to shall issue licensing may be
of little consequence.
IV. EXISTING EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF SHALL ISSUE LICENSING
Most empirical discussions of shall issue licensing compare homi-
cides in Florida before and after the beginning of its law. Homicide is
the most accurately recorded crime, reducing the influence of mea-
surement error on the comparison. Florida adopted its law earlier
than did the other states, providing more time to study the effects.
All existing comparisons of Florida homicide rates before and af-
ter the passage of the Florida shall issue law found that Florida homi-
cides decreased after the shall issue law. The National Rifle
Association, for example, notes that Florida's homicide rate fell by
21% when comparing 1987 with 1992.21
Although the Florida experience appears to support a deterrent
effect, the existing comparisons suffer from several weaknesses. First,
18 Franklin Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings7, 35 U. CHI. L. Ruv.
721 (1968); PhilipJ. Cook, The Technology of Personal Violence, in 14 CRIME &Jus.: ANN. REV.
REs. 1 (Michael Tonry ed., 1991).
19 See, e.g., LAFIERRE, supra note 7, at 36-38; Jeffrey R. Snyder, A Nation of Cowards, 113
PUB. INTEREsT 40 (1993). See also FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 10.
20 In a survey of prison inmates, Wright and Rossi found that a majority of gun-carrying
criminals cited armed victims as an important motivation for their actions. WRIGHT &
Rossi, supra note 17, at 150. Of course, criminals rarely will know with certainty if a poten-
tial victim has a concealed gun. Even unarmed victims may therefore be more vulnerable
to harm.
21 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, FACT SHEET: CAR-
RYING CONCEALED FIREARMS (CCW) STATISTICS (1994). See also LAPIERRE, supra note 7, at
33; Kopel, supra note 7, at 63; George F. Will, Are We 'A Nation of Cowards', NEWSWEEK, Nov.
15, 1993, at 92-93.
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these studies all use Uniform Crime Report data compiled by the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In 1988, the FBI did not publish
crime counts for Florida. Evaluations based on the FBI data thus must
ignore 1988 or use estimates of the 1988 total. This is important be-
cause 1988 was the first full year after the law's passage.22
Second, the existing evaluations use short time series of annual
data. Even in Florida, there are few annual observations after the law
began, and most comparisons only include those years immediately
prior to the law's passage. Because crime increases and decreases over
time due to the operation of many factors, comparisons using short
time series are highly prone to the influence of chance events that
briefly push homicides above or below their average levels.
Third, the existing comparisons examine total homicide rates for
the entire state. If some areas respond differently to the laws than do
others, a statewide analysis may miss important effects. For example,
the influence of shall issue laws may be greatest in urban settings
where crime is most prevalent. If this is true, including rural areas in
an analysis would make it more difficult to detect changes in violence.
Similarly, combining firearms and other weapon homicides might
mask effects unique to one type of murder.
Fourth, most existing studies compare homicide levels before the
shall issue law only with levels in 1991 or later. In February 1991, Flor-
ida adopted background checks of handgun buyers, and in October
1991, it began a waiting period for handgun purchases. 23 Compari-
sons that use only 1991 or later years cannot separate the effects of the
shall issue law from those of the other two laws. The reductions in
homicides that these studies claim may as easily be due to the other
policies as to shall issue licensing.
In short, current evaluations leave much room for doubt about
the effects of the Florida law. The shall issue laws in Mississippi and in
Oregon have not received even this limited attention. A more de-
tailed analysis using data from all three states would allow stronger
inferences about the impact of the policies.
V. RESEARCH DESIGN
A. STUDY DESIGN AND DATA
Similar to existing evaluations of shall issue licensing, this study
used an interrupted time series design to estimate average homicide
22 In addition, from 1988 through 1991 Florida did not report data to the FBI that
distinguished firearms homicides from homicides by other means. Existing comparisons
use only total homicide counts.
23 F" STAT. chs. 790.065, 790.0655 (1992).
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levels before and after shall issue policies began.2 4 We studied pat-
terns in Florida, Mississippi, and Oregon. In addition, we analyzed
monthly homicide counts and examined only large urban areas within
the three states. To find if the laws influenced gun deaths differently,
firearm homicides were separated from homicides by other means.
We conducted analyses for Dade (Miami), Duval (Jacksonville),
and Hillsborough (Tampa) counties in Florida, and for Hinds (Jack-
son) county in Mississippi. Because there were relatively few homi-
cides in Multnomah county (Portland), we combined Clackamas,
Multnomah, and Washington counties in Oregon. For each area, we
used death certificate data compiled by the National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS) to count monthly homicides through De-
cember 1990.25 Health departments in Florida, Mississippi, and Ore-
gon provided additional cases fromJanuary 1991, to December 1992.
For all areas except Miami, we studied the period between Janu-
ary 1973 and December 1992 (240 months). We confined our Miami
analysis to January 1983 through December 1992 (120 months) be-
cause of an unually sharp increase in homicide rates in May 1980 after
an influx of Cuban refugees. In late 1982 the rates appeared to
stabilize.
26
In total, there were 177 months before the shall issue law in Jack-
sonville and Tampa, and 57 months before the shall issue law in
Miami. For all three Florida cities there were 63 months after the law.
In Mississippi there were 210 pre-law months and 30 post-law months.
In Oregon there were 204 pre-law months and 36 post-law months.
To remove the effects of systematic variation from each time se-
ries, we developed autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
noise models.2 7 The noise models allow for variables, such as poverty
or age structure, which influenced homicides both before and after
the legal changes. If not controlled, these variables may bias infer-
ences about the laws.
After developing suitable noise models, we added intervention
models to measure changes in homicides following the shall issue
laws. 28 We considered three intervention models: an abrupt perma-
nent change model, a gradual permanent change model, and an ab-
24 See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND
ANALYSIs ISSUES FOR FIELD SETrINGS 207-32 (1979).
25 Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics,
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Mortality Detail Files, 1968
to 1990 (1993).
26 Still, we reached similar conclusions when we analyzed all 240 months of Miami data.
27 GEORGE E. P. Box ET AL., TIME SERIES ANALYsIS: FORECASTING AND CONTROL (3d ed.
1994).
28 Id. at 462-69.
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rupt temporary change model.2 9 For each series, the abrupt
permanent change model provided the best fit to the data.30
Our analysis avoids the major problems of previous comparisons.
The NCHS data collection system is independent of the FBI, allowing
us to use 1988 Florida homicide counts.31 The long monthly time
series provides more stable estimates of homicide patterns before and
after the shall issue laws began. By studying firearms and other
weapon murders separately in several areas, we can more precisely iso-
late any changes due to the laws.
B. THREATS TO VALIDITY AND SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS
Interrupted time series studies are among the strongest non-ex-
perimental research designs.3 2 Still, as is true with any design, time
series studies do not eliminate all threats to valid inference.
Perhaps the most important threat to the design's validity is "his-
tory," the possibility that a permanent change in another variable pro-
duced an observed effect.3 3 For example, suppose that each area
adopted other policies that influenced crime when they began their
shall issue laws. These policies then would be confounded with the
laws, and they would be historical threats to validity.
The major method we used to avoid historical threats was replica-
tion of the analysis in five metropolitan areas. An unnoticed historical
event may have increased or decreased homicides in any single area
after its shall issue law began. Yet if similar outcomes occur in several
different places after the laws, historical events become a less plausible
explanation of the change.3 4 With a consistent set of results, an his-
torical explanation would require that each area witness permanent
changes in other causes of homicide at about the time its law began.
These changes would have to influence homicides in the same way in
each area, increasing them in all five areas or decreasing them in all
five areas.
The areas in our study are geographically separated and demo-
graphically diverse, and they adopted their laws at three different
29 See DAVID McDowALL Er AL., INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 83-85 (1980.
30 Id. at 83-85 (discussing criteria for selecting the best-fitting model).
31 For a description of the FBI and NCHS data collection systems, see Marc Riedel,
Nationwide Homicide Data Sets: An Evaluation of the Uniform Cdime Reports and the National
Center for Health Statistics Data, in MEASURING CRIMF: LARGE-SCALE, LONG-RANGE EFFORTS
175 (Doris Layton MacKenzie et al. eds., 1990).
32 See DONALD T. CAMPBELL &JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMEN-
TA- DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 37-43 (1963).
33 COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 211.
4 CAMPBELL & STANLEY, supra note 32, at 42 (pointing out that the natural sciences
heavily rely on time series designs, and use replications to rule out rival hypotheses).
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times. While the replications cannot entirely rule out history, a consis-
tent set of results would greatly narrow the range of historical events
that could account for an effect. On the other hand, a varied pattern
of results, with large increases or decreases in only one or two areas,
would support an historical explanation.
Beyond replication, we used two additional methods to assess his-
torical threats. First, we searched for other legal changes, especially
changes in firearms laws, which might affect homicides. The most sig-
nificant laws we found were Florida's background check, adopted in
February 1991, and waiting period, adopted in October 1991. 35
Florida's waiting period and background check laws began more
than three years after shall issue licensing, leaving little data to esti-
mate their effects. Still, we included these laws in a supplementary
analysis to verify that they were not confounded with the licensing pol-
icy. Because the waiting period followed the background checks
closely in time, we considered them as a single law that began in Feb-
ruary 1991.
As a second check on historical threats, we estimated models that
included homicide counts for the entire United States as an addi-
tional independent variable. This analysis studied whether homicide
changes in the five areas simply mirrored national patterns; that is,
homicide levels may have changed after the laws only because of
events common to the nation as a whole. If this were true, the shall
issue laws would not influence homicides net of the national counts.
We could obtain national homicide counts only through the end
of 1991.36 This limits the amount of data after the shall issue laws,
especially in Mississippi and Oregon. Still, the national analysis pro-
vides an idea of whether broad historical events can explain any ob-
served local changes.
Besides considering historical threats, we also conducted a sup-
plementary analysis that used homicide rates instead of homicide
counts. The population of all five areas grew over the study period,
especially in the Florida cities. Homicide counts thus may have
changed after the laws in part because of increases in the populations
at risk.
To remove the influence of population, we estimated models for
homicide rates per 100,000 persons. Only annual population figures
35 FLp. STAT. chs. 790.065, 790.065 (1992). As we noted earlier, Oregon changed sev-
eral other features of its firearms laws when it adopted shall issue licensing. Because these
other changes began with the shall issue policy, we cannot separately estimate their effects.
36 Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics,
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Mortality Detail Files, 1968
to 1991 (1994).
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were available, so we.aggregated homicides in each area by year.37 Be-
cause the annual data provided few cases to study changes in rates, we
next pooled all five areas using a fixed effects analysis of variance
model.38 This created a single set of data, with seventy observations
before the laws and twenty after the laws.39 As in the main analysis,
we then estimated separate equations for firearm homicides and for
homicides by other methods.
In the pooled equations we first removed the mean homicide
rates for each area and year. This controls for constant rate differ-
ences between the areas and for events that similarly influenced rates
across all areas in a given year.40 We then included intervention vari-
ables to measure the effects of the shall issue and (for the Florida
cities) background check, and waiting period laws.
VI. RESULTS
Estimates of the effects of the shall issue laws on the monthly
homicide counts appear in Table 1. To simplify the presentation, we
report only the means before the laws and the changes in homicides
after the laws began.41
The results in Table 1 show that firearms homicides increased in
four of the five areas in the post-law period. Except the increase in
Miami and the decrease in Portland, these changes were statistically
significant (p < .05). Expressed as percentages, the changes varied
from a decrease of 12% (Portland) to an increase of 75% (Jackson-
ville).42 Considering each area as a replication of the same experi-
ment, gun homicides increased by an average of 26%. An inverse
normal combined test of statistical significance easily rejected the null
37 For 1973-1978 we used county-level population estimates from U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, BuREAu OF THE CENsus, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES (various
years). For 1980-1992 we used unpublished Census Bureau estimates. The Census Bureau
did not estimate county populations in 1979, and we interpolated values for that year.
38 See CHENG HSIAO, ANALYSIS OF PANEL DATA (1986).
39 Florida and Mississippi began their laws in the middle of the year. In the annual
analysis we placed the interventions for these states at the first full year after the laws, 1988
for the Florida cities and 1991 for Jackson. Oregon's law began in January 1990, so we
placed Portland's intervention at 1990.
40 HsiAo, supra note 38, at 138-40.
41 An appendix that describes the analysis in more detail is available from the authors.
42 The NCHS data include civilian justifiable homicides, in which private citizens killed
criminals during attempted felonies. We thus cannot dismiss the possibility that part of the
rise in firearms murders was due to permit holders who shot offenders in self-defense.
Still, justifiable homicides are rare, and it is not plausible that they could account for the
bulk of the increase. According to FBI data for 1992, there were 262 justifiable handgun
homicides in the entire United States, 1.7% of the 15,377 firearm murders. See FEDERAL
BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1992, at 15-22 (1993).
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hypothesis of zero overall change.43
In contrast to gun homicides, homicides by other means did not
show a consistent pattern of effects. Homicides without firearms in-
creased in Tampa and Jacksonville, but they fell in the other three
areas. Across all five areas, the average change in homicides without
guns was an increase of less than 1%. In combination, this change was
statistically insignificant.
Table 2 contains the analysis for the Florida cities that includes
the state's waiting period and background check laws. These results
provide no evidence that the original estimates were due to con-
founding between the other laws and shall issue licensing. Adding the
other laws slightly increased the coefficients for the shall issue policy,
but it did not alter their statistical significance.
Although not central to our study, it is worth noting that the
levels of each Florida firearms series decreased after the waiting pe-
riod and background checks began. Yet homicides without guns also
fell in two cities, and the policies should influence only firearm
crimes. The results do not point to any strong conclusions about the
waiting period and background check laws.
Table 3 presents the analysis that adds national homicide counts
to control for patterns in the United States as a whole.44 In each area,
there was a positive relationship between local homicide patterns and
patterns in the nation. Still, including the national counts only mod-
estly changed the estimates for shall issue licensing.
Finally, Table 4 reports the results for the annual homicide rates.
Here the coefficient for the shall issue policies is the average effect
across all five cities. Gun homicides increased on average by 4.5 per
100,000 persons, a value significantly different from zero. In contrast,
murders without guns decreased insignificantly. Gun homicides fell
insignificantly following Florida's waiting period and background
check laws, while other weapon homicides increased.
VII. DISCUSSION
Across the five areas, firearms homicides increased in the after-
math of the shall issue laws. In contrast, homicides without guns re-
mained steady. These findings were little altered when we considered
other laws, controlled for variations in national homicide counts, and
43 See LARRY V. HEDGES & INGRAM OLKIN, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR META-ANALYSIS 39-
40 (1985). The test assumes that the replications are independent. Because we include
three cities from the same state in the analysis, this is probably only approximately correct.
44 Because the national counts were not stationary in level, we used their first differ-
ences in this analysis. See Box, supra note 27, at 89-130 for a discussion of nonstationary
time series models.
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allowed for population change.
The pattern of results leads us to two conclusions, one stronger
than the other. The stronger conclusion is that shall issue laws do not
reduce homicides, at least in large urban areas. If there were such a
decrease, other events would have to push murders up strongly
enough to mask it in all five areas that we studied. Such events are
possible, of course, but we believe that they are extremely unlikely.
The weaker conclusion is that shall issue laws raise levels of fire-
arms murders. Coupled with a lack of influence on murders by other
means, the laws thus increase the frequency of homicide. This inter-
pretation is consistent with other work showing that policies to discour-
age firearms in public may help prevent violence. For example,
studies by Pierce and Bowers and by O'Carroll et al. found that laws
providing mandatory sentences for illegal gun carrying reduced fire-
arms crimes in Boston and Detroit. 45 Similarly, Sherman et al. found
that gun crimes fell during a Kansas City program that confiscated
firearms from people who carried them outside their homes.46
Despite this evidence, we do not firmly conclude that shall issue
licensing leads to more firearms murders. This is so because the ef-
fects varied over the study areas. Firearms homicides significantly in-
creased in only three areas, and one area witnessed an insignificant
decrease. In combination, the increase in gun homicides was large
and statistically significant. Yet we have only five replications, and two
of these do not clearly fit the pattern.
The statistical significance of the combined results aside, the
analysis implies that shall issue policies do not always raise levels of
gun murder. Sometimes, at least, local conditions operate to blunt
any effects. The areas without significant increases, Portland and
Miami, may be unusual, but we lack the data to examine whether this
is true.
Stated in another way, we cannot completely dismiss historical
events as an explanation of the increases in firearms murders. One
would need a complex theory to explain how history could mask a
decrease in homicides after the laws. Historical accounts of the appar-
ent increase might be much simpler. One would then be left with the
hypothesis that the effects of the laws are nil.
45 Glenn L Pierce & WilliamJ. Bowers, The Bartley-Fox Gun Law's Short-Term Impact on
Crime in Boston, 455 ANMALS AM. ACAD. Poi. & Soc. Sci. 120, 120-37 (1981); Patrick W.
O'Carroll et al., Preventing Homicide: An Evaluation of the Efficacy of a Detroit Gun Ordinance,
81 Am.J. PUB. HEA.TH 576 (1991).
46 Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Kansas City Gun Experiment, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JusncE RESEARCH IN BmiF (Jan. 1995). Sherman and associates note that abotit 20% of the
seized firearms were legally carried.
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A more definitive analysis should be possible in the future. Be-
sides Mississippi and Oregon, six other states have adopted shall issue
laws based on the Florida model. Four of these-Alaska, Idaho, Mon-
tana, and Wyoming-have small populations and low levels of crimi-
nal violence. 47 As a result, it would be difficult to perform a
statistically meaningful analysis of changes in homicides after their
laws began.
Yet, two more populous states, Arizona and Tennessee, enacted
shall issue licensing in 1994.48 Given several years of experience with
the laws in these areas, future research could provide more certain
estimates of the effects on firearms violence.
Between January 1995 and March 1995, the legislatures of Arkan-
sas, Utah, and Virginia sent shall issue laws to their Governors for sig-
nature.49 Similar laws were pending in an additional fourteen states,
including California, Illinois, and Texas.50 Given this level of interest,
it is likely that shall issue licensing will continue to receive attention in
the future.
While our analysis does not allow a firm conclusion that shall is-
sue licensing increases firearms homicides, it does suggest caution
about these laws. Some observers consider strict limits on firearms
outside the home to be among the most effective forms of gun con-
trol.5 1 Beyond any influence on violence, the policies are easy to en-
force and they do not inconvenience most gun owners. When states
weaken limits on concealed weapons, they may be giving up a simple
and effective method of preventing firearms deaths.
47 ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.65.700-8.65.720 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-8-321 (1993); Wyo. STAT. § 6-8-104 (1994).
48 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1315 (1994).
49 Roger Worthington, Support Mounting for Concealed Guns, CI. TRiB., Mar. 6, 1995, at
Al.
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Table 1
MEAN NUMBERS OF HOMICIDES PER MONTH, BYJURISDICTION AND
METHOD, BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF SHALL
ISSUE LICENSING
Type of Homicide Before the Shall
and Location Issue Law Change After the Shall Issue Law*
no./mo. no./mo. SE % t-Statistic
Firearm
Miami 25.88 0.79 1.09 +3 0.73
Jacksonville 6.24 4.78 0.61 +75 7.84
Tampa 4.91 1.10 0.44 +22 2.50
Portland area 2.79 -0.34 0.35 -12 -0.98
Jackson 3.64 1.57 0.47 +43 3.34
Mean change = +26.2% Inverse normal combined Z = -6.01, p < .0001
Other Methods
Miami 9.58 -0.73 0.63 -8 -1.16
Jacksonville 2.85 1.03 0.32 +36 3.22
Tampa 2.74 0.48 0.42 +17 1.14
Portland area 2.46 -0.58 0.38 -24 -1.53
Jackson 1.34 -0.30 0.27 -22 -1.11
Mean change = -0.2% Inverse normal combined Z = +0.25, p = .8023
* Difference between the mean number of homicides per month before implementation of the
shall issue law and the mean number after its implementation.
Table 2
MEAN NUMBERS OF HOMICIDES PER MONTH IN FLORIDA AREAS, BY
JURISDICTION AND METHOD, BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF
SHALL IsSUE LICENSING AND WAITING PERIOD AND BACKGROUND
CHECK LAWS
Change After the Waiting
Type of Homicide Change After the Shall Period and Background
and Location Before the Laws Issue Law* Check Laws**
no./mo. no./mo. SE t-Statistic no./mo. SE t-Statistic
Firearm
Miami 25.88 2.25 1.19 1.89 -3.99 1.51 -2.64
Jacksonville 6.21 6.10 0.61 10.00 -3.11 0.86 -3.62
Tampa 4.91 1.35 0.52 2.60 -0.68 0.77 -0.88
Other Methods
Miami 9.60 0.11 0.53 0.21 -2.48 0.68 -3.65
Jacksonville 2.86 1.25 0.38 3.29 -0.60 0.56 -1.07
Tampa 2.74 0.42 0.49 0.86 0.17 0.72 0.24
* Difference between the mean number of homicides per month before implementation of the
shall issue law and the mean number after its implementation, controlling for the waiting period
and background check laws.
** Difference between the mean number of homicides per month before implementation of the
waiting period and background check laws and the mean number after their implementation,
controlling for the shall issue law.
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Table 3
MEAN NUMBERS OF HOMICIDES PER MONTH, BY JURISDICTION AND
METHOD, BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF SHALL ISSUE
LICENSING, CONTROLLING FOR NATIONAL HOMICIDE COUNTS
Type of Homicide Change After the Shall Coefficient for National
and Location Constant Issue Law* Homicide Counts**
no./mo. no./mo. SE t-Statistic slope SE t-Statistic
Firearm
Miami 25.86. 1.55 1.12 1.38 0.0144 0.0063 2.29
Jacksonville 6.23 5.36 0.64 8.37 0.0015 0.0019 0.79
Tampa 4.91 1.17 0.49 2.39 0.0014 0.0015 0.93
Portland area 2.80 -0.44 0.42 -1.05 0.0015 0.0014 1.07
Jackson 3.62 1.61 0.57 2.82 0.0011 0.0013 0.85
Other Methods
Miami 9.62 -0.43 0.55 -0.78 0.0010 0.0051 0.20
Jacksonville 2.86 0.96 0.35 2.74 0.0181 0.0214 0.85
Tampa 2.75 0.81 0.45 1.80 0.0077 0.0205 0.38
Portland area 2.46 -0.28 0.43 -0.65 0.0039 0.0019 2.05
Jackson 1.35 0.22 0.27 0.81 0.0027 0.0013 2.08
* Difference between the mean number of homicides per month before implementation of the
shall issue law and the mean number after its implementation, controlling for national homicide
counts.
** Slope estimate for influence of national homicide counts, controlling for the shall issue law.
Table 4
POOLED ANNUAL HOMICIDE RATES, BEFORE AND AFTER
IMPLEMENTATION OF SHALL ISSUE LICENSING AND WAITING PERIOD
AND BACKGROUND CHECK LAWS
Firearms Homicide Rate Per 100,000
Coefficient Estimate SE t-Statistic
Shall Issue Licensing 4.52 1.75 2.58
Waiting Period and
Background Check -3.25 2.09 -1.55
Constant 11.20 0.53 21.13
Other Methods Homicide Rate Per 100,000
Coefficient Estimate SE t-Statistic
Shall Issue Licensing -0.16 0.75 -0.21
Waiting Period and
Background Check 1.81 0.90 2.01
Constant 5.02 0.23 21.83
